



Prior’s puzzle is standardly taken to be the puzzle of why, given the assumption
that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of “the proposition that P” for
“that P” within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs is invalid. I
show that Prior’s puzzle is much more general than is ordinarily supposed. There
are two variants on the substitutional form of the puzzle—a quantificational variant
and a pronominal variant—and all three forms of the puzzle arise in a wide range
of grammatical positions, rather than merely in the complements of propositional
attitude verbs. The generalized puzzle shows that a range of proposed solutions to
the original puzzle fail, or are radically incomplete, and also reveals the connections
between Prior’s puzzle and debates over the nature of semantic types and higher-order
quantification. I go on to develop a novel, higher-order solution to the generalized
form of the puzzle, and I argue that this higher-approach is superior to its first-order
alternatives.
1. Prior’s Puzzle
The standard theory of propositional attitude verbs is that they denote binary
relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S Vs that P”
is true iff the subject referred to by “S” stands in the relation V to the referent of
the that-clause, which is a proposition. But if that-clauses refer to propositions,
we should be able to substitute other, co-referring expressions for that-clauses
salva veritate.1 But in many cases we cannot. Consider the following pair:
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1We should be able to make such substitutions on the assumption that the positions in
which that-clauses occur are fully extensional. This is an assumption made by nearly everyone
in the debate, and I will make it here, too. Also, throughout I will use the terms “refer” and
“denote” interchangeably to pick out the single relation of interpretation used in standard
compositional semantic theories. The key feature of this relation is that it is a two-place relation
that takes names in both of its argument positions—standardly, the name of an expression and
then the name of the object denoted by that expression—the object denoted typically being a
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(1) a. Sally fears that Fido bites.
b. Sally fears the proposition that Fido bites.
The standard theory tells us that “that fido bites” refers to a proposition. It also
seems clear that “the proposition that Fido bites” refers to a proposition—indeed,
the very same proposition. And yet (1-a) can be true while (1-b) is false—Sally
does not fear an abstract object. We may call this Prior’s puzzle, after Arthur Prior
[1971, p. 16], who first formulated it.
This paper first shows that Prior’s puzzle is not just a puzzle concerning
substitutions such as the one above. Rather, the failure of such substitutions
to preserve truth is a special case of a puzzle that is much more general along
two dimensions. First, the substitutional puzzle has both quantificational and
pronominal variants that have the same source and warrant the same solution as
the original form. Thus, Prior’s puzzle has nothing specifically to do with substi-
tution. Second, all three of these forms of the puzzle arise in the complements of
all kinds of attitude verbs, in adjectival positions, in adverbial positions, and in
a variety of other positions as well. Thus, Prior’s puzzle has nothing specifically
to do with that-clauses or propositional attitude verbs.
This generalization has several important consequences. First, the general-
ized puzzle shows that a wide range of proposed solutions to Prior’s puzzle fail,
or are radically incomplete. Many such proposals apply only to the substitu-
tional puzzle, and cannot be generalized to its quantificational or pronominal
variants. Other proposals apply only to the case of propositional attitudes, but
cannot be extended to solve the puzzle as it arises in other grammatical positions.
Still other views fail in both of these ways.
Second, this generalization reveals the way in which Prior’s puzzle is deeply
intertwined with debates over the nature of semantic types and the status of
higher-order quantification. In particular, one’s approach to solving the general-
ized form of Prior’s puzzle is determined by, and also reveals, one’s views on two
questions that are fundamental to semantic theorizing: whether all expressions
in a language refer to their semantic values, and relatedly, whether all quantifiers
in natural language—including quantifiers that occur in predicate, sentence, and
adverbial positions, among others—can be reduced to first-order quantifiers over
set.
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semantic values of the appropriate kinds.
There are two general approaches to semantics which answer these questions
in opposing ways. The first approach is the standard one within compositional
semantic theories that trace their origins to Frege via Montague. Such theories
employ a single, first-order interpretation function, and reduce quantifiers in all
grammatical positions to first-order quantifiers, thus answering the two ques-
tions in the affirmative. This assimilationist approach to semantics entails what
I call the nominal assimilation approach to Prior’s puzzle. The second approach
is the one adopted by theorists who make use of higher-order resources in the
semantic metalanguage. Such approaches employ a higher-order interpretation
function, and higher-order resources in the metalanguage, and in doing so an-
swer both questions in the negative. This higher-order, anti-assimilationist ap-
proach to semantics entails what I call the non-nominal resistance approach to
Prior’s puzzle.
I conclude the paper by contrasting representatives of these two strategies,
and developing a novel, resistance solution to the generalized form of the puz-
zle. I first present the assimilationist view of Forbes [2006, 2018]. I show that
while Forbes’ view provides an intuitive solution to a wide range of instances of
the generalized puzzle, assimilationism itself is subject to a range of objections. I
then show how to develop a resistance solution by extending the semantic frame-
work due to Williamson [2013], and show how it overcomes the objections to
assimilationism. However, I go on to argue that the best form of the resistance
approach incorporates the key insights of Forbes’ proposal, while still making
use of higher-order resources.
2. Quantificational and Pronominal Variants of the Puzzle
Prior’s puzzle is typically presented as a puzzle concerning a distinctive kind of
substitution within the complements of propositional attitude verbs—substitution
of a propositional description such as “the proposition that P” for its embedded
that-clause. It is also sometimes taken to concern the substitution of names for
that-clauses, as in (2):
(2) a. Gödel fears that mathematics reduces to logic.
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b. Gödel fears logicism. Nebel [2019]
Just as in (1), (2-a) does not entail (2-b), despite the fact that “logicism” and “that
mathematics reduces to logic” appear to refer to the very same proposition. Call
this form of substitution—in which a nominal expression is substituted for an
apparently co-referential non-nominal one—nominal substitution.2 Prior’s puzzle
is ordinarily taken to be the the puzzle of accounting for why nominal substitu-
tion for the complements of many propositional attitude verbs—construed as an
inference or argument—is invalid.
But Prior’s puzzle has nothing specifically to do with substitution. Consider
again our example from above:
(3) Sally fears that Fido bites.
Suppose that the that-clause in (3) refers to a proposition. We can then generalize
over that proposition; (4) follows from (3):
(4) Sally fears something.
But now consider the standard semantics for the existential quantifier in type-
theory:3
(5) J∃utφKM,g = 1 iff there is some a ∈ Dt such that JφKM,g
a
ut = 1
In (5), ut is a variable over the type t, and JφKM,g
a
ut is the result of assigning a
to occurrences of ut in φ. Letting p be the type of object denoted by “that fido
bites”—the type of propositions—the clause yields that (4) is true iff:
(6) There is some a ∈ Dp such that Sally fears a.
Clearly, (6) can be false even when (3) is true; Sally can fear that Fido bites
without there being some a in the set of propositions such that Sally fears a.
2A note on terminology. By “nominal” expression I mean an expression of type e that
has a denotation within the domain of individuals, De. Such expressions are also sometimes
called “referring expressions” or “singular terms”. I will also use “nominal variable” for a
variable of type e. This use of “nominal” picks out a semantic or a logical category, rather than
a syntactic one. In English syntax, there are expressions headed by nouns—e.g. quantified
noun phrases—that do not count as nominal by this definition.
3See, for instance, Dowty et al. [1981, p. 91], van Benthem and Doets [1983], Enderton
[2001], Väänänen [2019], among many others.
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Thus, on the assumption that the standard semantics for the existential quantifier
is correct, the apparently valid inference from (3) to (4) turns out to be invalid.
We can make a similar point in the object language. Consider (7), which is the
result of translating (6) into the object language:
(7) Some proposition is such that Sally fears it.
On the assumption that that-clauses refer to propositions, (7) should be equiva-
lent to (4), and so should follow from (3). But clearly it does not follow from (3),
and so is not equivalent to (4).
Call the form of quantification whose truth-conditions are given by (5) nom-
inal quantification, and call quantifiers whose semantics are given by (5) nominal
quantifiers. The key feature of nominal quantification is that it spells out the
truth-conditions of quantified sentences such as (4) in the metalanguage using
first-order quantification over sets. Since first-order quantifiers bind variables in
name positions, the clause in (5) assimilates quantification over the entire clausal
complement of “fears” to quantification into a name position. This is why nomi-
nal quantification warrants its name. In what follows, I will use “nominal quan-
tification” and “first-order quantification” interchangeably.
The examples above show that nominal, or first-order, existential generaliza-
tion over the semantic values of the complements of propositional attitude verbs
is invalid. Moreover, given the interdefinability of the existential and universal
quantifiers, we can expect that nominal generalizations of all kinds over the se-
mantic values of such verbal complements will be invalid. Further, both nominal
substitution and quantification yield the same kind of absurdity; both yield the
result that Sally fears an abstract object—a proposition—although (1-b) makes
clear just which proposition she fears.
We can formulate another variant of the puzzle using pronouns. Consider
the following example:
(8) a. Sally fears that Fido bites.
b. Sally fears it.
c. Sally fears so.
If we suppose that “that Fido bites” refers to a proposition, then there is no
reason why “it” in (8-b) cannot refer to that very same proposition. But if we
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interpret “it” in this way, the meaning of (8-b) differs from that of (8-a) in exactly
same way we observed in the substitution and quantificational puzzles: (8-b) is
interpreted as meaning that Sally fears an abstract object, and so does not follow
from (8-a). This contrasts with (8-c), which preserves (8-a)’s natural reading.
Now consider a dialogue in which (9-b) follows (9-a):
(9) a. Sally fears that Fido bites.
b. ∗Bill fears it, too.
c. Bill fears so, too.
Call the anaphoric use of “it” in (9-b) a case of nominal anaphora. In the dialogue,
(9-b) is awkward at best; nominal anaphora is infelicitous. By contrast, (9-c)
uttered on the heels of (9-a) is fully felicitous. These cases show that Prior’s
puzzle arises for pronouns both when they serve as substituends, and when they
are used anaphorically in discourse. While I think the anaphoric form of the
puzzle is important and distinct from the substitutional form, going forward I
will for the most part set infelicity and anaphora aside, and consider only truth
preservation. As a consequence, going forward I will focus on pronouns only as
they figure into the substitutional form of the puzzle.
The substitutional and quantificational forms of the puzzle are intimately re-
lated. If nominal quantification into a position is valid, then substitution of singu-
lar terms—including names, definite descriptions, and pronouns—will likewise
be valid, because these singular terms serve as witnesses for nominal existential
quantifiers.4 Conversely, if one can validly substitute nominal expressions into a
particular position, then nominal existential quantification into that position will
be valid, because the referents of those nominal expressions will be the objects
over which nominal existential quantifiers generalize, given the standard seman-
tics. Thus, the validity of nominal substitution and nominal quantification go
hand in hand.5
This connection between nominal substitution and nominal quantification is
well known. At least since Quine [1956] and Kaplan [1968], we have known that
nominal quantification and the substitution of co-referential nominal expressions
4By “witness” I here mean an expression that, when substituted for the existential quantifier,
yields a true substitution instance of the quantified sentence.
5The validity of nominal substitution and quantification likewise go hand in hand with the
felicity of nominal anaphora, but as I said, I will here set this issue aside.
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fail in concert within the complements of attitude verbs, propositional or other-
wise. This gives us reason to think that the failures of nominal substitution and
generalization in Prior’s have the same source, and that jointly, such failures
form a unified, more general puzzle. Moreover, given that nominal substitution
and quantification have traditionally been used to test expressions for whether
they are referring expressions, we have good reason—at least preliminarily—to
think that the failure of both can be traced to the assimilation of expressions
whose semantic function is not to refer to expressions whose function is to refer.
3. Generalization to other Grammatical Positions
Not only does Prior’s puzzle have both quantificational and pronominal vari-
ants, but neither the original puzzle nor its variants are specific to that-clauses
or propositional attitude verbs. Rather, perfectly analogous puzzles arise in a
variety of other positions. Consider the following examples:
(10) a. Sally seeks a unicorn
b. Sally seeks the generalized quantifier denoted by “a unicorn”.
(11) a. Sally forgot who came to the party.
b. Sally forgot the question of who came to the party.6
(12) a. Sally became wise.
b. Sally became the property of being wise.7
(13) a. Sally painted carefully.
b. Sally painted the property of events denoted by “carefully”.
6You might think that this case does not differ from the propositional case, because to
forget who came to the party is to forget that x, y, and z came to the party. This would be
a mistake. First, the same phenomenon occurs for verbs such as “investigate” that are not
reducible to propositional attitudes (see Friedman [2013]). Second, even if embedded questions
are true just in case the embedding verb relates you to an answer to that question, wh-clauses
still denote questions—i.e. sets of answers—and so we should be able to pick out that same
answer with a nominal expression without a change of truth-value. But clearly we cannot. The
same phenomenon arises for many other verbs, including “study”, “investigate”, “overlook”,
“see”, “know”, etc.
7Friederike Moltmann [2003, 2004] uses this example to illustrate what she calls the objec-
tivization effect. All of the examples of invalid substitutions here are instances of the objectiviza-
tion effect.
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On the traditional, Montagovian semantics for the notional reading of an in-
tensional transitive verb, the intensional NP “a unicorn” denotes an intensional
generalized quantifier.8 But substitution of a description of this semantic value
in (10) changes the sentence’s truth-conditions—(10-a) can be true while (10-b)
is false. Similarly, substitution of a description of the question denoted by the
wh-phrase in (11) changes the sentence’s truth-conditions: Sally can forget who
came to the party without forgetting a set of propositions. In (12), while Sally
might have become wise, she did not become the property of being wise, and in
(13), surely Sally can paint carefully without painting a function from properties
to properties.
Further, the quantificational form of the puzzle arises for (10-a)-(13-a) as well.
Consider the following inferences:
(14) a. Sally seeks a unicorn.
b. Sally seeks something.
(15) a. Sally forgot who came to the party.
b. Sally forgot something.
(16) a. Sally became wise.
b. Sally became something.
(17) a. Sally painted carefully.
b. Sally painted somehow.
In each case, application of the standard semantics for the existential yields the
following truth-conditions for (14-b)-(17-b), respectively:9
(18) There is some a ∈ D〈s,〈〈s,〈e,t〉〉,t〉〉 such that Sally seeks a.
(19) There is some a ∈ D〈s,〈s,t〉〉 such that Sally forgot a.
8This proposal is not uncontroversial. On another account of the notional reading, due to
Zimmermann [1993, 2006a], intensional NPs denote properties. But as we will see below, the
same problem arises for this proposal.
9Here, and throughout, I make use of what I take to be the standard type-assignments
for expressions of the relevant kind within a functional type theory, like the one developed
by Montague [1974]. Nothing in my arguments turns on exactly how one types the relevant
expressions, nor does anything turn on making use of functional as opposed to relational
types—the two approaches to type theory are provably equivalent.
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(20) There is some a ∈ D〈s,〈e,t〉〉 such that Sally became a.
(21) There is some a ∈ D〈〈e,t〉,〈e,t〉〉 such that Sally painted a.
If these standard truth-conditions for the existential quantifier are correct, then
each of the generalizations in (14)-(17) are invalid. Each of (18)-(21) can fail to
be satisfied even while (14-a)-(17-a) are true.10 As we saw above, in all of these
positions, the quantificational and substitutional puzzles arise together, as a con-
sequence of the connection between nominal substitution and first-order quan-
tification. And again, both problems appear to arise from nominal assimilation:
from the assimilation of expressions whose function is not to refer to referring
expressions, and the assimilation of quantifiers that bind higher-type variables
to first-order, nominal quantifiers.
Finally, the pronominal form of the puzzle arises in all of these cases again
as well. In each case, substitution of “it” fails to preserve truth, and nominal
anaphora results in infelicity. This contrasts with the use of non-nominal pro-
forms such as “one”, “that”, and “thus”, which preserve truth and are fully
felicitous in discourse.
This generalization of the puzzle has an immediate negative result: it reveals
that a wide a range of proposed solutions to the substitutional form of Prior’s
puzzle are radically incomplete—and fail to solve the generalized puzzle—or
perhaps fail altogether. Appreciating how such proposals fail will reveal the
kind of solution that stands to succeed, and so it is to these failures that I now
turn.
4. Criticism of Existing Proposals
The first casualties of the generalized puzzle are views such as those endorsed by
Zimmermann [2006b], Grzankowski [2018], and Nebel [2019], on which the inva-
lidity of nominal substitution is explained by the fact that nominal substituends
10Moltmann [2003, 2004, 2008] calls quantifiers such as the ones in (14)-(17) “special quanti-
fiers”. While she points out that such quantifiers are distinctive, she does not point out that
treating them as nominal quantifiers renders basic quantificational inferences invalid. And
while her views on the semantics of such quantifiers have changed, one proposal is that such
quantifiers range over so-called “variable objects”. But this view, even if intelligible, likewise
renders these inferences invalid.
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denote different things than the expressions they replace. First, consider Nebel’s
view. On his view, “the proposition that Fido bites” does not refer to a proposi-
tion. Rather, it denotes a propositional concept—a function from worlds to propo-
sitions. Thus, on Nebel’s view, (1-a) can be true while (1-b) is false because
they have different internal arguments. This allows Nebel to preserve the view
that that-clauses refer to propositions, while accounting for the change in truth-
value. It also allows him to maintain that propositional attitude verbs are univo-
cal across substitutions such as (21)—the only difference between (1-a) and (1-b)
lies in their arguments.
However, Nebel’s proposal fails when it confronts the quantificational and
pronominal forms of the puzzle. To see this, we can first ask: does Nebel’s view
validate nominal EG? More specifically, does Nebel’s view validate the inference
from (1-a) to (4), where (4) has the semantics in (6)?
(1-a) Sally fears that Fido bites.
(4) Sally fears something.
(6) There is some a ∈ Dp such that Sally fears a.
Or, equivalently in the object language, does (1-a) entail (7)?
(7) Some proposition is such that Sally fears it.
Given that Nebel holds that that-clauses refer to propositions, his answer should
be “yes”; nominal EG over non-empty referring expressions in extensional con-
texts appears to be an incontrovertible logical principle. But if Nebel answers
“yes”, then he fails to solve the quantificational puzzle; as we saw above, the
quantificational puzzle just is the puzzle of showing why nominal quantification
into such positions is invalid. So in order to solve the puzzle Nebel must answer
“no”. In fact, Nebel [2019, p. 92] seems to endorse a negative answer when he
claims that “proposition”, as it occurs in sentences such as (22), does not denote
a set of propositions:
(22) Sally fears a proposition.
Rather, on his view, “proposition” denotes a set of propositional concepts, and so
(22) is true iff Sally fears a particular member of that set. Thus, he claims, (7)
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does not follow from (1-a). But this reasoning entails that nominal existential
generalization is invalid, which contradicts the assumption that “that Fido bites”
is a referring expression in the first place. The only way out is for Nebel to
hold that that-clauses refer to propositions, that nominal EG over those clauses is
invalid, and to develop a non-nominal semantics for “something” that validates
the inference from (1-a) to (4)—a seemingly impossible position to maintain.11
But this is not the last of Nebel’s problems. Nebel’s view (a) fails to solve the
pronominal form of the puzzle; (b) is specific to the propositional case; and (c)
contrary to what he claims, does not allow propositional attitude verbs to remain
fully univocal, since propositional attitude verbs would have to be type-shifted
in order to accept propositional concepts as arguments. I conclude that his view
fails.
Similar problems doom Zimmermann’s [2006b] view. Consider (24) and (25):
(24) John seeks a unicorn.
(25) John seeks the property of being a unicorn.
Clearly, (24) does not follow from (25). On Zimmermann’s view of ITVs, “a uni-
corn” in (24) denotes a property: λx[unicorn′(x)]. By contrast, “the property of
being a unicorn” denotes a distinct, higher-order property: roughly, the property
of being the property of being a unicorn. Thus, he claims, (25) predictably does
follow from (24). But this view likewise fails to solve the quantificational puzzle.
Given that “a unicorn” denotes a property, we can ask whether (26) follows from
(24):
(26) John seeks something.
Given that “a unicorn” refers to a property, the inference from (24) to (26) should
be valid, when “something” has the semantics in (5). But clearly it is not. The
11Even if Nebel claims that “proposition” denotes a set of propositional concepts, and Dp
does not denote the set of propositions, then EG with the following semantics must be valid on
his view:
(23) There is some a ∈ Dp such that Sally fears ∨a,
where ∨a is the extension of the propositional concept a—namely, a proposition. But it clearly
is not.
12 · Justin D’Ambrosio
moral of the quantificational puzzle is that nominal EG is invalid, and unless we
make changes elsewhere in the sentence, we have to give up the presumption
that that-clauses refer to propositions.
The generalization of the puzzle to the non-propositional case also under-
mines another strategy for addressing Prior’s puzzle—a strategy adopted by
Moffett [2003], Parsons [1993], and Harman [2003]. They hold that solving
Prior’s puzzle is simply a matter of finding the appropriate kinds of objects for
each attitude, and finding the appropriate nominal substituends to pick out these
objects. For example, while we may not fear propositions, we do plausibly fear
states of affairs; while we may not know propositions, we do know facts; and
while we do not want propositions, we do want various outcomes. Once we find
the appropriate substituends, they argue, nominal substiution and quantification
are valid.
Moffett [2003] adopts a strategy of this sort to solve the problem of “doxastic
shift”, which is, in effect, Prior’s puzzle applied to “knows”. The problem is that,
while one can know that P, it does not follow that one knows the proposition that
P; rather, in the sense relevant here, one knows facts, not propositions. Accord-
ingly, Moffett proposes a change in the rule governing predication for verbs like
“know”. On his view, while that-clauses denote propositions, the predicate “is
known by Sally” applies to facts corresponding to propositions, as opposed to
propositions themselves. Parsons [1993] develops a similar view on which in
some cases, that-clauses denote propositions, while in others they denote facts
that are “determined” by those propositions. Harman [2003], likewise, holds
that in cases where we observe the substitution failure, that-clauses must denote
objects distinct from, but suitably related to propositions.
But again, this approach does not solve the generalized puzzle; it fails when
we consider the generalization of the puzzle to other grammatical categories. The
approach fails in the case of intensional transitive verbs, as in (10), in the case of
questions, as in (11), and in the case of adverbs, as in (13). The problem in these
cases is that any nominal subsitution will yield an invalidity. Once we recognize
this, we see that Moffett’s view forces (10-a) to be false—an unacceptable conclu-
sion.12 Parsons’ and Harman’s views fails for the same reason: in many cases,
there are no truth-preserving nominal substituends to be found. These failures
12For a different criticism of Moffett’s view, see Forbes [2018].
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show that attempting to solve the generalized puzzle by finding the appropriate
kind of object for each attitude is a lost cause.
5. Resistance and Assimilation
The generalized form of Prior’s puzzle can be thought of as a test for whether
an expression serves to refer to its semantic value. If an expression refers to its
semantic value, then substitution of co-referential nominal expressions will pre-
serve truth, and nominal EG over that expression’s referent will be valid. When
co-referential nominal substitutions for an expression do not preserve truth, and
when nominal EG is invalid, it tells us that the expression does not serve to
refer, but instead serves a different semantic function. Call such expressions
non-nominal expressions, and call the positions in which they occur non-nominal
positions.13 A solution to the generalized form of Prior’s puzzle requires us to
explain why nominal substitution and quantification into non-nominal positions
is invalid. It also requires us to develop a theory that vindicates valid generaliza-
tions into such positions, such as the generalization from (1-a) to (4). This latter
task requires us to either develop a theory of non-nominal quantification, or to
show how nominal quantification into such positions can be valid after all.
There are two general strategies for meeting these desiderata. The first is
what I call the strategy of nominal assimilation. This strategy assimilates all non-
nominal expressions to nominal ones, and assimilates non-nominal quantifiers
to nominal quantifiers. It then uses a variety of mechanisms to account for why
nominal substitution fails to preserve truth, and to show how nominal quantifica-
tion is valid after all. Assimilationism is entailed by, and standardly developed
within, the approach to semantics that can be traced to Frege via Montague—
what I call the assimilationist approach to semantics. The assimilationist ap-
proach employs a single, first-order relation of semantic interpretation that re-
lates expressions of all different types in a language to objects of appropriate
kinds in a model—typically sets. This relation is what I have here been calling
“reference” or “denotation”. By employing a first-order relation in the metalan-
guage to interpret expressions of all types, the assimilationist approach treats
13As with my use of “nominal expression”, I use “nominal position” to pick out a semantic
or logical position, rather than a syntactic one.
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every expression of the object language as, in effect, a proper name of its se-
mantic value.14 Assimilationist theories then employ the nominal semantics for
quantification given in (5), which spells out the semantics for quantifiers that
bind variables of different types as many-sorted first-order quantification in the
metalanguage.
The assimilationist approach to semantics is closely related to what Prior
[1971, Ch. 3] himself called the program of Platonism. The basic idea behind the
program of Platonism is to convert every expression—perhaps excepting logical
and copular expressions—to a referring expression while preserving meaning.
Such meaning preservation is possible, Prior claims, provided one is willing to
engage in a program of paraphrase or regimentation. Lewis, a proponent of
assimilationism, makes just this point in discussing the possibility of replacing a
language’s theoretical terms with nominally quantified variables:
We may stipulate that our T-terms are names, not predicates or func-
tors. No generality is lost, since names can purport to name entities
of any kind: individuals, species, states, properties, substances, mag-
nitudes, classes, relations, or what not. Instead of a T-predicate ‘F__’,
for instance, we can use ‘__ has F-hood’; ‘F-hood’ is a T-name pur-
porting to name a property, and ‘__ has __’ is an O-predicate. It
is automatic to reformulate all T-terms as names, under the safe as-
sumption that our O-vocabulary provides the needed copulas:
‘__ has the property __’
‘__ is in the state __ at time __’
‘__ has __ to degree __’
and the like. We will later replace the T-terms with bound variables;
by making the T-terms grammatically uniform, we avoid the need to
introduce variables of diverse types. [Lewis, 1970]
Here Lewis illustrates the assimilationist strategy perfectly: we can assimilate all
expressions to names so long as we are prepared to regiment those sentences to
14As Potts [1979] points out the dominant view of the λ-calculus since Church [1951] has
been that each λ-expression serves as a proper name.
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accommodate nominalization. Other proponents of the assimilationist strategy
are King [2002], Forbes [2006, 2018], both of whom will be discussed below.
The second strategy for solving Prior’s puzzle is what I call the strategy
of non-nominal resistance. This strategy aims to solve Prior’s puzzle by pre-
serving the idea that non-nominal expressions are genuinely semantically dif-
ferent from nominal ones, and insisting that non-nominal quantifiers cannot be
reduced to first-order quantifiers ranging over different subsets of the first-order
domain. Rather, on the resistance proposal, expressions of different semantic
types—for example, predicates, quantifiers, modifiers, and various kinds of ver-
bal complements—do not serve to name their semantic values, but rather have
a variety of different semantic functions; predicates predicate, quantifiers quan-
tify, modifiers modify, etc. Further, quantifiers that replace expressions of these
different types are irreducibly higher-order; such quantifiers are not nominal
quantifiers. On the resistance view, Prior’s puzzle is the result of illicitly assim-
ilating expressions with one semantic function to expressions with another—it
is the result of illicit nominalization. With this account of what has gone wrong
with nominal substitution and quantification, the resistance view then aims to
come up with a theory of non-nominal quantification that validates the requisite
quantificational inferences.
This approach to Prior’s puzzle is entailed by, and is naturally developed
within, the approach to semantics that makes use of fundamentally higher-order
resources in the metalanguage—what I call the resistance approach to seman-
tics. The resistance approach is motivated by a range of semantic, logical, and
ontological considerations, many of which stem from a dissatisfaction with as-
similationism.15 Among the resistance is Prior himself.16 Prior held that only
names refer, and so there is no question of what non-nominal expressions desig-
nate or refer to, for designation is not in their semantic job description. Further,
Prior held that quantification into non-nominal positions is intelligible on its
15Making use of higher-order resources in the metalanguage is thought to (i) provide
remission from various ontological commitments [Yablo, 1996, Rayo and Yablo, 2001], (ii) allow
us quantify over absolutely everything [Williamson, 2003, Linnebo, 2006, Rayo and Uzquiano,
2006], (iii) allow us to state a fully general semantic theory for a language [Linnebo and Rayo,
2012, Williamson, 2013], and to solve the concept horse problem [Jones, 2016]. Wright [2001]
and Liebesman [2015] develop resistance views that attempt to solve the concept horse problem,
but neither makes use of higher-order resources in the metalanguage.
16See in particular Prior [1971, pp. 32-41].
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own terms, and should not be reduced to first-order quantification over seman-
tic values. On this view, the generalized form of Prior’s puzzle is the result of
illicitly treating positions in which expressions with higher semantic types occur
as name positions, and reducing quantifiers that generalize into such positions
to first-order ones.
The key difference between the assimilationist and resistance programs lies
in their approach to semantic interpretation. On assimilationist approaches, se-
mantic interpretation is a first-order binary relation between expressions of a
language and entities in a model, expressed in the metalanguage by a first-order
binary relation symbol. Thus, the only semantic distinctions between different
expressions in a language come from the fact that they bear this relation to dif-
ferent kinds of objects, and quantifiers into different grammatical positions are
distinguished only in ranging over different subsets of the first-order domain. By
contrast, the resistance strategy employs a mechanism of semantic interpretation
that is itself higher-order—i.e. the resistance approach employs a higher-order
interpretation or assignment function in the metalanguage. The semantics for
higher-order quantification can then be specified in terms of this higher-order in-
terpretation function, which allows the quantifiers to be genuinely higher-order,
and avoids first-order reduction. The next section explores how the assimilation-
ist and the resistance strategies attempt to solve the generalized puzzle.
6. Two Representatives Compared
6.1. Nominal Assimilation: Forbes
Recall our examples of the substitutional puzzle from above.
(10) a. Sally seeks a unicorn.
b. Sally seeks the generalized quantifier denoted by “a unicorn”.
(11) a. Sally forgot who came to the party.
b. Sally forgot the question of who came to the party.
(12) a. Sally became wise.
b. Sally became the property of being wise.
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(13) a. Sally painted carefully.
b. Sally painted the property of events denoted by “carefully”.
For the moment, focus only on (10-b)-(13-b). What is the right semantics for these
sentences? Intuitively, (10-b), (11-b), and (13-b) involve ordinary transitive verbs,
and have direct objects that are denoted by the definite descriptions that serve as
substituends. (12-b) seems to involve an identity reading of “become”. Yes, these
sentences are strange, but we have an intuitive grasp of their meanings: each of
them expresses a relation between Sally and an abstract object. Moreover, there
is strong intuitive pull to the idea that the nominal substituends in (10)-(13) de-
note the same things as the expressions they replace; “the generalized quantifier
denoted by ‘a unicorn’ ” appears to denote the same thing as “a unicorn”, and
likewise for the other pairs. That’s why the (b)-sentences seem so strange—they
seem to say that the subject bears a relation to an abstract object that they would
normally only bear to something concrete.
These considerations support the view that what changes in each of these
substitutions is not the semantic value of the verb’s complement, but rather the
denotation of the verb itself. Views of this kind are developed by King [2002]
and Forbes [2018], although both focus only on the case of propositional atti-
tude verbs. King and Forbes argue that that-clauses and their corresponding
propositional descriptions refer to the same things, but that-clauses and their cor-
responding propositional descriptions differ syntactically, and it is this syntactic
difference that occasions the change in the verbal denotation. Here I will focus
primarily on Forbes’ view, but much of what I say straightforwardly carries over
to King’s view as well.17
As Forbes [2018] develops this view, substitution of a noun phrase for a co-
referring that-clause changes the thematic role played by the propositional deno-
tation of both expressions. On this view, Prior’s puzzle is the result of a shift in
the argument structure of the verb that results from a change in the syntax of its
complement. Returning to our original example, on Forbes’ view, (27-a) has the
logical form in (27-b), while (28-a) has the logical form in (28-b):
17King’s view and Forbes’ view differ in that King’s is classical, while Forbes’ is neo-
Davidsonian. In virtue of being neo-Davidsonian, Forbes view has a few slight advantages, to
which I will return in the conclusion.
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(27) a. Sally fears that Fido bites
b. ∃e[fear(e) & in(e,Sally) & content(e,that Fido bites)]
(28) a. Sally fears the proposition that Fido bites
b. ∃e[fear(e) & in(e,Sally) & theme(e,the proposition that Fido bites)]18
In (27), Sally is in a state of fearing, and “that fido bites” refers to a proposition
that serves as the content of that state. By contrast, in (28), Sally is in a state of
fearing, and “the proposition that Fido bites” refers to a proposition that serves
as the theme of that state—i.e. the state’s direct object. Thus, Forbes’ view pre-
serves the view that both that-clauses and their corresponding descriptions refer
to propositions, but takes the syntactic difference between phrasal and clausal
complements to occasion a change in the role played by that proposition. The
exact same view can be extended to solve the problem that arises from substitu-
tion of a pronoun such as “it” for the that-clause complement. This solves the
substitutional form of Prior’s puzzle
What about the quantificational form? Consider the inference from (27-a) to
(29):
(29) Sally fears something.
Is this inference valid? If we combine Forbes’ semantics with the standard clause
for the quantifier in (5), the result is (30):
(30) ∃a ∈ Dp∃e[fear(e) & in(e,Sally) & content(e,a)]
This clearly follows from (27-a), when (27-a) is given the semantics in (27-b).
Thus, by complicating the semantics of the attitude ascription, Forbes’ view vin-
dicates nominal EG into the complement of “fears”.
Finally, why did nominal quantification into the complement of “fears” origi-
nally look invalid? The reason is that “fears” is ambiguous between thematic and
non-thematic versions, and quantification into the theme role clearly does not fol-
low from (27-a). Moreover, truth conditions like (31) and paraphrases such as
(32) force the thematic reading of the verb:
18Forbes derives these logical forms compositionally using a sequent calculus, together with
a type theory that takes events as a basic type. Here I present only the logical forms, but the
type-theoretic background will become relevant below.
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(31) There is some a ∈ Dp such that Sally fears a.
(32) Some proposition is such that Sally fears it.
On Forbes’ view, both of these sentences have the following semantics:
(33) ∃a ∈ Dp∃e[fear(e) & in(e,Sally) & theme(e,a)]
Since (33) involves a different argument structure than (27-b), the inference from
(27-a) to (33) is not valid. This explanation of the invalidity of nominal quan-
tification thus pairs perfectly with the explanation of the invalidity of nominal
substitution. Both are invalid because they force the verb to have its direct-object,
“thematic” reading.
Moreover, while Forbes’ focuses only on propositional attitudes, his view can
be generalized to a wide range of cases. For example, Forbes can tell an exactly
parallel story for intensional transitive verbs such as “seeks”. On Forbes’ view,
sentences such as (10-a) have the following semantics:
(34) a. Sally seeks a unicorn.
b. ∃e [search(e) & agent(e,Sally) & char(e,Q)]
Where Q is the generalized quantifier denoted by “a unicorn”. We can then give
the semantics of (35-a) as in (35-b):
(35) a. Sally seeks something.
b. ∃a ∈ Dq, e [search(e) & agent(e,Sally) & char(e,a)],
where Dq is the domain of generalized quantifiers. On this semantics, (35-a)
clearly follows from (34-a) via nominal existential generalization. Moreover, this
semantics makes sense of the role that abstract objects play in the semantics of
intensional verbs. Substitution of a nominal expression for “a unicorn” serves to
change the role that the denotation of “a unicorn” plays in the event:
(36) a. Sally seeks the generalized quantifier denoted by “a unicorn”.
b. ∃e [search(e) & agent(e,Sally) & theme(e,the generalized quantifier
denoted by “a unicorn”)]
In (36-b), the substitution of a definite for an indefinite has occasioned a change
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in the argument structure of the verb; it specifies the theme of the verb, rather
than characterizing it. Similar extensions of Forbes’ framework account for the
rest, or at least the majority of, the examples above.
Forbes’ view assimilates apparently non-nominal positions—that-clauses, in-
tensional NP complements, question complements, etc—to referring expressions;
each such expression refers to a set of an appropriate type. Further, by complicat-
ing the semantics of the verbs in question, and positing an ambiguity, it renders
nominal quantification valid on one of these readings: propositions frequently
serve as the contents of states of fearing, but rarely as their themes. The dis-
tinction between content and theme is a highly intuitive component of Forbes’
solution.
However, Forbes’ view faces a problem. One of the key features of the view is
that “the proposition that Fido bites” and “that Fido bites” co-refer—his view is
an assimilationist view. But on Forbes’ view, which is developed within type the-
ory, these expressions also have different semantic types. These facts entail that
Forbes’ view confronts a version of the concept horse problem. To see this, first
note that the two expressions differ syntactically, and in virtue of this syntactic
difference force different argument structures for the verb “fear”—one involving
a “theme” role and another involving the “content” role. The theme of a state of
fearing is of type e, while the content is of type t (or of type 〈s, t〉 in an intensional
setting). Thus, on Forbes’ view, “that Fido bites” denotes a truth-value, and “the
proposition that Fido bites” denotes an entity. But on the plausible assumption
that no members of Dt are members of De, Forbes’ view leads to a contradiction,
for it entails an identity between something of type t and something of type e.
A closely related problem arises when we try to specify the denotations of
expressions such as “the property of being a unicorn”, as in (37):
(37) “The property of being a horse” denotes a function from entities to truth-
values.
In Forbes’ type-theory, (37) is true because “the property of being a horse” is ex-
actly what property-type expressions like “is a unicorn” denote. But “the prop-
erty of being a unicorn” is a referring expression, and so denotes an object in De.
But then, by (37), some member of De is a function from entities to truth-values.
So some member of De is a member of D〈e,t〉. But this cannot be, since no function
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is a member of its own domain. The very same problem arises if we assign “the
property of being a horse” another type, such as 〈〈e, t〉, t〉.19
Moreover, similar worries arise whenever we have expressions of type e that
pick out objects other than properties—i.e. expressions such as “the proposition
that Fido bites”, “the generalized quantifier denoted by ‘a unicorn”’, and “the
property of being a unicorn”, “Logicism”, etc, in our language. If we assign a
type to these expressions, then the denotations of such expressions must be in
De. But when we try to specify their semantics, we will often be able to show that
their denotations are both in De and in some higher type domain generated from
type e. But on the assumption that denotations are sets, the axiom of regularity
guarantees that this is impossible.20
One standard response to this problem is to limit the applicability of the type
theory, and to exclude expressions like “a function from entities to truth values”
and other pieces of the semantic metalanguage from the interpreted fragment.
But this significantly restricts the expressive power of the theory. Moreover, or-
thodox type theory faces a range of other expressibility problems; it cannot, for
instance, express absolutely general quantification, and cannot provide a fully
general semantics for a first-order language. This gives us reason to look for a
view that solves these problems. As I will argue below, such a view can be de-
veloped by retaining the neo-Davidsonian components of Forbes’ proposal while
giving up its assimilationist commitments.
6.2. Non-Nominal Resistance: A Williamsonian Proposal
The alternative to the strategy of nominal assimilation is to deny that that-clauses
refer to propositions, and likewise to deny that quantifiers that replace that-
clauses are nominal quantifiers over propositions. This strategy can then be
generalized to all expressions for which Prior’s puzzle arises. This is what I
19Here I am grateful to Zoltán Gendler Szabó, who offers a very similar objection to type
theory in his talk “Semantic Categories”. Szabó himself rejects type theory altogether in favor
of an account which employs a plural notion of semantic interpretation. I am sympathetic to
his view, but will not discuss it further here.
20Assuming, of course, that the higher types are ones generated by type e. The proof is
simple using the axiom of regularity. Suppose there is some function that is a member of its
own transitive closure. Then there is some sequence of sets x1 . . . xn such that xn ∈ x1 ∈ . . . ∈
xn−1 ∈ xn . But if we consider the set a = {x1 . . . xn}, we see that it is a violation of the axiom of
regularity, since none of the members of a are disjoint from a itself.
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call the strategy of non-nominal resistance.
The strategy of non-nominal resistance is most naturally undertaken in a
semantic framework that makes use of higher-order metalinguistic resources.21
The key feature of higher-order semantic theories that allow them to solve the
puzzle is that such theories generally employ higher-order mechanisms of se-
mantic interpretation, and as a consequence, on such views, it is false that that-
clauses refer, and a fortiori, false that they refer to propositions. While the mate-
rials for such a solution to Prior’s puzzle are readily available in the literature—
particularly in the work of Rayo and Yablo [2001], Rayo [2006], Linnebo [2006],
and Williamson [2013], and Krämer [2014]—no one has used these materials to
formulate such a solution. Here I illustrate how to develop such a solution by
extending the semantic ideas proposed by Williamson [2013].
Williamson, like higher-orderists generally, holds that expressions of differ-
ent semantic categories have different semantic types. But instead of account-
ing for differences in semantic type by assigning each expression a set from
the appropriate type domain, and so treating them as names of those objects,
Williamson interprets expressions of different semantic types using a higher-
order function in the metalanguage that serves as both an interpretation and
assignment function. In the relational type theory in which Williamson presents
his view, this function, a〈e,λ〉, has the type 〈e, λ〉 where λ is the limit type which
collects together all of the finite types. In a functional type theory, this expres-
sion would have type 〈e, 〈λ, t〉〉. Since I have so far been making use of functional
types, in what follows I will convert Williamson’s type assigments to functional
types, although nothing of substance turns on this choice.22
Roughly speaking, assigning a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉 the limit type in its second argument
position allows a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉 to be radically type-polymorphic in its second argument
position; expressions of type λ are always also of some more specific finite type.
21Although it need not be. On the view proposed by Rieppel [2016], predicates (e.g. “happy”)
and their corresponding definite descriptions (e.g. “the property of being happy”) bear different
first-order semantic relations to one and the same denotation. However, it is unclear how
Rieppel’s view generalizes to cases other than that of predicates.
22The relational type 〈e, λ〉 is ordinarily interpreted as a subset of De × Dλ , which is exactly
how the type 〈e, 〈λ, t〉〉 is interpreted—this latter type takes an element of De and returns a
characteristic function on Dλ that yields true for each member of Dλ to which the member of
De is related. Of course, the higher-order view disavows both of these interpretations, since
both assign sets as the references of expressions of all types.
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This allows a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉 to simultaneously interpret expressions of each semantic type
in the object language in a non-nominal, higher-order way appropriate to that
type. Notably, a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉 is only nominal in its second argument place when it is
used to interpret expressions of type e.23
To understand how this approach to semantic interpretation bears on Prior’s
puzzle, consider the substitutional puzzle in the propositional case:
(1) a. Sally fears that Fido bites.
b. Sally fears the proposition that Fido bites.
Here, let us suppose that “that Fido bites” is of type 〈s, t〉. In that case, a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉
applied to “that Fido bites” yields (38):
(38) a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉(“that Fido bites”,that Fido bites).
In (38), the occurrence of “that Fido bites” in the metalanguage is not a referring
expression, but retains non-nominal status—the second argument-place of the
function a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉, in this instance, has not only the infinite type λ, but also the
more specific finite type 〈s, t〉. In other words, a has propositional type in its
second argument position, and so is appropriate for interpreting constants and
variables of that type. It does not treat that-clauses as referring to propositions.
By contrast, application of a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉 to “the proposition that Fido bites” yields
(39):
(39) a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉(“the proposition that Fido bites”,the proposition that Fido bites),
where the use of “the proposition that Fido bites” is of type e. Thus, the higher-
order view interprets “that Fido bites” and “the proposition that Fido bites”
differently—they are of different semantic categories, and thus have different
interpretations. Given this difference, substituting the latter for the former is
not predicted to preserve truth. Since semantic types are not merely differen-
tiated by denoting objects from different subsets of the first-order domain, the
23Assuming that there is a limit type and employing it in the metalanguage is controversial.
Krämer [2017], for example, argues that assuming cumulative types prevents us from expressing
absolutely general quantification. However, nothing I say here turns on the assumption of such
a type. Everything I say could be formulated using an alternative framework, such as the one
presented by Krämer [2014], who proposes a hierarchy of denotation functors, den1 . . . denn , for
each finite type n.
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higher-order theorist denies that “the proposition that Fido bites” and “that Fido
bites” refer to the same thing, and indeed that the latter refers at all. Thus the
higher-order view predicts that substitutions such as (1) will not preserve truth.
On the contrary, given the semantic types of each of the expressions, the de-
fault prediction in cases of inter-type substitution is semantic uninterpretability.
For the higher-order theorist, such substitutions are on a par with substituting a
name for a predicate in first-order logic. On the higher order view, such substi-
tutions are, quite literally, category mistakes, and so are predicted to be semanti-
cally ill-formed. This prediction is borne out by the large range of cases in which
such substitutions do yield nonsense. For instance, consider the following pair:
(40) a. Sally hopes that Fido is friendly.
b. Sally hopes the proposition that Fido is friendly.
Here, substitution of a propositional description for a that-clause yields ill-formedness.
Such ill-formedness is the subject of another closely related puzzle called Run-
dle’s puzzle, of which (40) is one instance.24 Rundle’s puzzle, like Prior’s puzzle,
has both substitutional and quantificational forms, and occurs in a wide range
of grammatical positions. But unlike Prior’s puzzle, it concerns interpretability
or grammaticality, rather than truth-preservation. For instance, when we try to
substitute a nominal expression for a verb, for an attributive adjective, or for
any number of other expressions, or when we try to nominally quantify into
such positions, the result is uninterpretable, just as in (40)—one cannot hope a
proposition. On the whole, the result of nominal substitutions is more often non-
sense than sense; uninterpretability is the normal result. The higher-order view
predicts exactly this.
The higher-order approach solves Prior’s puzzle by treating it as a special
case of Rundle’s puzzle. The higher-order approach prohibits nominal sub-
stitution and nominal quantification on general, type-theoretic grounds. But
sometimes—as in all of the cases of Prior’s puzzle above—the result of such
nominal substitution is well-formed and interpretable due to the presence of an
altogether different verb—in this case, transitive “fears”—that accepts expres-
sions of type e in its second argument position. On the higher-order view, while
24See Rundle [1967], Nebel [2019], and Author [forthcoming] for discussion of Rundle’s
puzzle.
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the default expectation for such intercategorial substitutions is ill-formedness,
in some cases, verbs with complements of type 〈s, t〉 also have transitive forms
whose complements are of type e—i.e. that accept the nominalizations of expres-
sions of type 〈s, t〉. Such substitutions, while well-formed, are predicted to be
generally invalid, because both the verbs and their complements have different
types, and so different interpretations. Thus, the higher-order view solves both
Rundle’s puzzle and Prior’s puzzle in one fell swoop.
The higher-order view also solves the quantification puzzle easily. To see
this, consider again (3) and (4):
(3) Sally fears that Fido bites.
(4) Sally fears something.
On the higher-order view, “something”, as it occurs in (40), is an irreducibly
higher-order quantifier that binds a variable of type 〈s, t〉. Thus, (4) has the form
given in (41):
(41) ∃v〈s,t〉[fears(Sally,v〈s,t〉)]
Modifying Williamson’s view slightly, we can give the semantics of (41) as fol-
lows, where both a and b are of type 〈e, 〈λ, t〉〉 as we saw above:
(42) TRUE(p∃v〈s,t〉(fears(Sally,v〈s,t〉q),a) iff (∃b(VARIANT(a,
b,pv〈s,t〉q)) ∧ TRUE(pfears(Sally,v〈s,t〉q),b).25
Roughly, (42) says that (41) is true on a just in case there is some higher-order
assignment b that differs from a only in what it assigns to v〈s,t〉 and the open
formula “Sally fears v〈s,t〉” is true relative to that assignment. This clause is
thoroughly higher-order: it makes use of a higher-order assignment function,
higher-order quantification over that assignment function, and a higher-order
relation, VARIANT, between two assignment functions and a variable.
This proposal simultaneously shows why inferences like the one from (3) to
(4) are valid, and why construing “something” as a nominal quantifier renders
the inference invalid. First, on this proposal, (4) true just in case (43) is true
25Here I have converted the definition given by Williamson [2013, p. 238] to the existential
case, omitted world variables from the metalanguage, and dropped the type-subscripts from a
and b for readability.
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relative to some assignment of an appropriate value to the variable:
(43) fears(Sally,v〈s,t〉)
Clearly, the assignment in (38) is just such an assignment, so on the semantics for
“something” given in (42), the inference from (3) to (4) is valid. Thus, we have
a theory of non-nominal quantification that does not reduce such quantifiers to
many-sorted first-order quantifiers.
Second, this semantics reveals why nominal existential generalization is not
predicted to be valid. On a nominal semantics, (4) is true just in case (43) is satis-
fied when v〈s,t〉 is assigned a member of Dp—i.e. when the assignment function
assigns the variable some proposition. But the clause in (42) requires nothing of
the sort. Since the members of Dp are of type e, nominal quantification assigns
v〈s,t〉 something of the wrong type, and so is predicted not to follow from (3)—it
assigns the free variable in (43) a value of the wrong type. Thus, the higher-
order view meets all three of the desiderata laid out above: it invalidates nom-
inal substitution, invalidates nominal quantification, and validates non-nominal
quantification. It also generalizes to every grammatical position for which the
puzzle arises—the semantics above works for variables of any type—and solves
the pronominal puzzle: pronouns can be treated as variables of different types.
The higher-order view also does not confront the version of the concept horse
problem confronted by Forbes. On the Williamsonian view, it is false that “that
Fido bites” refers to a proposition, and false that “the property of being a horse”
refers to a function from objects to truth-values. What is true is (38); the claim
that “that Fido bites” refers to a proposition is a loose, first-order paraphrase of
this higher-order claim. Further, given that a〈e,〈λ,t〉〉 interprets “that Fido bites”
and “the proposition that Fido bites” differently, no claim can be made that they
co-denote or co-refer. The concept horse problem is the result of treating all ex-
pressions as referring expressions. Since, on the higher-order proposal, expres-
sions of different semantic categories have different semantic functions, and only
those of type e can be said to refer, no such problem arises.26
However, the Williamsonian proposal does not address is the general fact
26However, see Jones [2016] for an argument that higher-order interpretation is in fact a
form of reference. Here I presume, as Williamson does, that there are different forms or modes
of semantic interpretation for each different semantic category, and that only expressions of
type e refer.
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that some inter-categorial substitutions are valid. For instance, for verbs like
“believe” and “concede”, nominal substitution of a propositional description for
a that-clause does seem to be truth-preserving:
(44) a. Sally believes that Fido bites.
b. Sally believes the proposition that Fido bites.
(45) a. Sally conceded that Fido bites
b. Sally conceded the proposition that Fido bites.
Given that the higher-order interpretation function interprets these expressions
as having different semantic types, it appears to be a mystery why such substitu-
tions are truth-preserving. Moreover, “believe” and “concede” are far from the
only verbs that behaves this way.
However, the fact that such substitutions are valid appears to be a lexical fact
about “believe” and verbs of that kind. The lexical fact is that their clausal and
transitive versions are equivalent after nominal substitution. Here the higher-
order view can take a cue from Forbes, and state meaning postulates connecting
the transitive and intransitive versions of these verbs. For instance, the higher-
order view can state the following postulate governing the two readings of “be-
lieve”:
(46) believe〈e,〈〈s,t〉,t〉〉(sallye,that Fido bites〈s,t〉)↔ believe〈e,〈e,t〉〉(sallye,the propo-
sition that Fido bitese)
This makes the validity of nominal substitution for the complement of “believes”
idiosyncratic to the meaning of “believes” itself. We might then also have to
state meaning postulates for every other verb that licenses nominal substitution.
This method, while somewhat ad hoc, is not implausible. It seems likely that the
reason that deducing that P and deducing the proposition that P are equivalent
has to do with the lexical meaning of “deduce”, rather than any general principle
governing verbs of this kind.
Here one might worry that, even if this approach provides a solution to
Prior’s puzzle, this solution isn’t novel. Aren’t there other higher-order, resis-
tance approaches to quantification and attitude verbs that provide, or would
provide, equally good solutions? What makes this view distinctive? There are
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two points to be made in response. First, it is true that there has been some
recent work on higher-order approaches to propositional attitude ascriptions. In
particular, Trueman [2018] has developed a resistance approach to the semantics
of propositional attitude verbs, and Jones [2019] has developed a higher-order
approach to the metaphysics of propositional attitudes themselves. It is likewise
true that each of these proposals is at least suggestive of the kind of solution
to Prior’s puzzle that I have offered here. But neither Trueman nor Jones dis-
cuss Prior’s puzzle in any of its forms directly, neither provides a semantics for
non-nominal quantification, and neither addresses cases other than the case of
propositional attitude verbs. Thus, while there is a clear consonance between
those views and the view developed here, they merely hint at a solution to one
aspect of a highly general semantic puzzle.
Second, there has been one attempt to provide a semantics for non-nominal
quantification that validates the inferences at issue in Prior’s puzzle: the pro-
posal developed by Tobias Rosefeldt [2008]. While view claims to accomplish
the same things as the view I have developed here, it does not do so, and is
ultimately not a non-nominal semantics at all. To see why, let us consider the
semantics Rosefeldt proposes for the existential quantifier. This semantics em-
ploys an interpretation function I, which is a function from expressions of a
typed language into a model—it takes an expression of type a to an object in the
appropriate type domain Da. Rosefeldt then defines what he calls αa-variant of
an interpretation I. According to Rosefeldt, if αa is a constant symbol of syntactic
type a in a language L, then
(47) an interpretation I∗ is an αa-variant of I iff I∗ differs only in which ele-
ment of Da it assigns to αa. Rosefeldt [2008, p.
322]
He then gives the truth-conditions for the existential quantifier as follows:
(48) If φ is of the form p∃χaψq then φ is true under I iff ψ[αa/χa] is true under
at least one αa-variant of I. Rosefeldt [2008, p. 323]
The problem with this proposal is that I is a function from expressions to objects
of the appropriate type, and it is nominal in its output or value position. Thus,
I assigns a value to αa from the appropriate domain by either naming that value
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or by nominally quantifying over objects from that domain. Thus, I is simply
a standard assimilationist interpretation function, and accordingly once again
makes it the case that all expressions of the language are, in effect, proper names
of their semantic values, and so incurs all of the problems outlined above for
assimilationism. A genuinely non-nominal semantics requires a mechanism of
interpretation that is higher-order—i.e. non-nominal—in its second argument
position, of exactly the sort involved in the proposal above.
7. Conclusion: A Neo-Davidsonian Resistance Solution
As we have seen, the higher order approach offers a general solution to both
Prior’s puzzle and Rundle’s puzzle by treating the former as a special case of
the latter. However, Forbes’ neo-Davidsonian approach is highly intuitive, and
has a range of other benefits. Perhaps most importantly, since on Forbes’ view,
the only thing that changes in nominal substitution is the thematic role occupied
by an argument, there is an important sense in which the verbs in question—
transitive and intransitive “fear”, for instance—remain univocal. Both forms
involve the unary property of events, fear(e). By contrast, on non-Davidsonian
classical views, transitive and clausal “fear” simply express different relations
that bear no interesting semantic relation to one another, but are, in certain cases,
held together by a meaning postulate.
This provides the neo-Davidsonian view with a number of advantages. One
is that it explains the semantic commonality between transitive and clausal ver-
sions of the verbs involved in Prior’s puzzle. Second, and relatedly, this allows
the neo-Davidsonian view to avoid arguments raised by Nebel [2019] to the ef-
fect that coordination of clausal and transitive versions of “fear” give rise to
zeugma. The Davidsonian view predicts that they will not. Finally, the David-
sonian view is metaphysically perspicuous—it does not simply treat transitive
and clausal versions of a verb as different relations, but rather makes clear what
differs about each of the states denoted by those events—they have different ar-
gument structures.
Luckily, the distinction between classical and neo-Davidsonian approaches to
Prior’s puzzle cuts across the distinction between assimilationist and resistance
strategies. It is perfectly possible to make use of a neo-Davidsonian theory at the
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first-order level, and make use of higher-order resources in the metalanguage.
That is to say, we can opt for a resistance form of Forbes’ neo-Davidsonian pro-
posal. The only change that would be required is to relinquish the idea that “the
proposition that Fido bites” and “that Fido bites” co-refer. We can then spell
out the semantics for the neo-Davidsonian type theory using irreducibly higher-
order resources, in ways that will allow us to avoid the problems with orthodox
type theory, and also allow us to make use of the generality of the higher-order
view that allows us to solve Rundle’s puzzle. The result is an attractive package
of views on which we introduce and preserve a distinction between an attitude
verb having a theme, and it having content, but avoid the view that expressions
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